Competition between the commercial paper market and commercial banks by John P. Judd
John P. Judd*
Many large, financially sound nonfinancial
corporations have relied primarily on the
commercial-paper market for short-term funds
during the prolonged business expansion ofthe
late 1970's. This important new development in
short-term corporate finance has occurredlarge-
ly at the expense of the money-center banks in
New York and other major financial centers.
According to our analysis, this development
stems from the unavoidably higher costs ofbank
as compared to paper-market credit, as well as
the relatively low value of the intermediation
"services" which banks can provide to potential
commercial-paper borrowers. Thustheobserved
trend represents an improvement in the efficien-
cy of the U.S. financial system.
Given these considerations, why did these
firms notswitchtothecommercial-papermarket
at some earlier date? First, given theconsistently
low interest rates ofthe 1950's and early 1960's,
they did not feel justified incurring the costs of
developing and maintainingthestaffexpertiseto
actively manage liquid assets and liabilities.
Corporations established a pattern of dealing
primarily with banks, even thoughdeposityields
were somewhat lower, and loan rates somewhat
higher, than those in the open-market. This
restricted commercial-paper growth, from both
the supply and demand sides of the market.
Second, even after interest rates began their
secular rise in the mid-1960's, corporateborrow-
ers remained uncertain about switching to the
paper market, because this meant departing
from (and possibly damaging)long-standingand
difficult-to-replace bank relationships. But the
greatly reduced availability ofbank creditin the
credit "crunches" of 1966 and 1969-70 created a
new financial environment. Once having over-
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come the obstacles to paper-market entry, eligi-
ble firms becameveryresponsiveto relative costs
indecidingbetweenalternativemeansoffinance.
Since bank credit is almost unavoidably more
expensive than paper-market credit, the switch
to the latter market is not likely to be reversed in
the foreseeable future.
This development has several important poli-
cy implications. Commercial-paper issuers al-
most always include the most financially sound
firms in the economy, and their reduced use of
bank loans thus implies greater riskiness of
bank-loan portfolios. The probable permanence
ofthis phenomenon should interestbankregula-
tors in setting capital-adequacy standards. Fur-
thermore, the switch to commercial paper by
many prime-rated bank loan customers rein-
forces the postwar trend toward greater bank
eXDosure to financial-market risk caused by the
de~line in capital cushions and holdings of low-
risk financial investments. It has been pointed
out elsewhere that banks now use liability man-
agement as their main source ofliquidity,sothat
regulatory actions which limit the flexibility of
this tool could contribute to a liquiditysqueeze. l
The impact of these recent developments va-
ries with the.region and size of banking institu-
tions, with the strongest effects felt by the large
banks in New York City and, to a lesser extent,
Chicago and San Francisco. Commercial-paper
market growth helps account for the widely
discussed weakness in loan demand at money-
center banksearlierinthecurrentcyclicalexpan··
sion. Furthermore, the spurt in loan demand
which large banks typically experience near the
end of expansions, when their highly liquid
customers finally run low on liquidity, may be
less pronounced at future cyclical peaks.
Finally, the borrowing cost advantage ofpap-
er over loans has risen above the level at whichmany eligible firms have substituted almost
entirely into paper. Thus, further moderate
changes in relative borrowingcosts do not cause
substantial substitution between paper and
loans. This development may enhance the use-
fulness ofbusiness loans as a business-cycle indi-
cator. Since the prime rate-paper rate spread
should be a less-important determinant of
business-loan demand than it has been in the
past, the correlation between loans and business
spending (and thus the business cycle) may be
greater. However, attempts to use estimated
loan-demand relationships to forecast business-
loan movements could be misleading, at least
until enough time has elapsed for new statistical
relationships to be estimated.
The first section ofthis paperdiscusses certain
theoretical considerations relevant to the com-
petitiveness of intermediaries vis-a-vis direct-
finance markets. The second section discusses
specific institutions and characteristics of the
commercial-paper and bank-loan markets. The
third section describes and analyzes the postwar
changes in the relationship between these two
markets, and this is followed by a discussion of
policy implications.
I. Direct Finance Versus Intennediation
Financial markets can contribute to economic
growth by efficiently allocating the funds ofnet
savers in the economy among economic units
engaged in capital formation. 2 This transfer of
funds between units with savings surpluses to
those with savings deficits can take two forms:
direct finance andintermediation. Directfinance
occurs when a deficit unit sells a financial instru-
ment to a surplus unit. Intermediation occurs
when a deficit unit borrows from a financial
intermediary-such as a bank-which in tum
sells a financial instrument to asurplus unit. In
order for savings to be optimally allocated
among competing real-investment opportuni-
ties, the transfer of funds between surplus and
deficit units must be accomplished in the least
costly way.
Economic functions of banks
Banks and otherfinancial intermediaries exist
because oftheir ability to channelfunds between
certain types of lenders and borrowers at a
smaller cost than is possible through direct
finance. If this were not the case, lenders and
borrowers would tend to use existing means of
direct finance, or would tend'to create new
financial markets. But howarefinancial interme-
diaries able to compete with direct finance mar-
kets? Banks, for example, are often large corpo-
rations with substantial operating costs-costs
whichcanbeavoidedwhen borrowerssell securi-
ties directly to lenders.
Financial intermediaries are able to compete
because they provide a number ofservices which
are attractive both to lenders and borrowers.
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Intermediaries transform the direct debt ofulti-
mate borrowers (e.g., bank loans) into indirect
debt (e.g., bank deposits) for sale to ultimate
lenders. In doing so, banks are able to pool the
funds ofa large number ofsmall savers to make
loans of varying sizes to borrowers. This helps
borrowers avoid the cost and inflexibility of
dealing with a number of small lenders, and
provides attractively denominated investments
for savers. Banks are also able to loan funds at
different maturities than those at which they
borrow. Thus, ultimate lenders and borrowers
can gain greaterflexibility inchoosingmaturities
than they could do with direct finance.
Lenders and borrowers also may be able to
obtain reductions in risk byusingintermediation
rather than direct finance. Because banks have
large portfolios, they can profitably make loans
and purchase securities across a broad spectrum
oftypes and maturities. At any pointin time, this
diversification reduces the risk of the entire
portfolio compared to that of the individual
financial assets. Thus banks can offer savers
indirect debt which generally has greater liquidi-
ty than the direct debt of ultimate borrowers.
Because of their portfolio diversification as well
as their capital cushion, banks can also reduce
risks experienced by firms over periods of time
such as business cycles. In addition, banks can
allocate funds less expensively than certain bor-
rowers and lenders, through exploiting econo-
mies ofscale and specialization. Banks canincur
economies of scale because ofthe large number
and volume oftheirloansand investments. Also,
they can reduce costs because of their expertthe rate they can earn on bank deposits (and
other liabilities), Rb, plus the yield equivalent of
the value ofbankservices (')I) tothe rate theycan
earn on open-market securities (Rs). As
Rs-Rb- ')I rises, lenders will supply a larger
quantity of credit to the open market compared
to banks.
Where, 0 M
S supply of credit to direct fi-
nance or open markets
B
S = supply of funds to banks
Y = unspecified exogenous vari-
ables
Rs, Rb, 'Y = defined in text.
Ultimate borrowers compare the bank loan rate
(RI) less the yield equivalent of the value of the
bank services (')I') to the rate they must pay on
open-market securities. As RI-Rs - ')I' rises,
borrowers will obtaina larger proportionoftheir
external funds through the open market com-
pared to banks.
d
~M d = 0" + (3'(RI-Rs-')I')
OM + B
+ }..'Y' ;(3' > 0 (2)
Where, OM
d demand for direct finance, or
open-market credit
B
d = demand for bank credit
Y' unspecified exogenous van-
abies
RI, Rs, ')I' defined in text
Consequently, the net effect ofthese two choices
is that lenders and borrowers will channel a
smaller proportion offunds through banks if the
bank spread, RI-Rb, rises relative to the cost of
channeling funds through the open market.
These open-market costs are the value of bank
services foregone by lenders and borrowers, plus
any explicit costs associated with the direct
transfer, such as brokeragefees. Since thesecosts
are likely to be relatively stable in the short run,
the volume of direct finance compared to bank
intermediation should vary positively with
changes in the bank spread. This relationship can
be derived by solving equations (I) and (2) for
market equilibrium (reduced-form) values of
knowledge, gained through specialized investing
and dealing with ultimate borrowers and savers.
Finally, the personal contact between bankers
and their customers allows transactions and
pricing mechanisms to be finely tunedtocustom-
ers' needs, and allows banks to acquire very
specific financial and other information. These
advantages can grow with the length of the
bank/customer relationship, because informa-
tion on both sides becomes more precise over
time. Many firms consider a solid banking rela-
tionship to be anessential part ofdoingbusiness.
Long-standing customers benefit because banks
will often make loans to them when they experi-
ence temporary financial difficulties or when
credit availability is limited overall. Since the
open market is generally less dependable in these
situations, firms can eliminate a great deal of
cyclical uncertainty by staying on good terms
with their bankers. In addition, banks can devel-
op very accurate credit profiles on long-standing
loan customers. Except where they are large
enough for national recognition, firms may be
able to obtain loans at lower rates from banks
than from the open market.
Clearly, the value of bank services is difficult
to measure, and varies between different ulti-
mate borrowers and lenders. For example,
smaller lenders especially may find certain bank
services valuable, such as investment expertise,
economies of scale, risk reduction, divisibility
and flexibility. Smaller, weaker borrowers may
find the personal bank relationship valuable~
certainly more so than large nationally-
recognized firms---because with that relation-
ship, cyclical risks can be reduced and credit
profiles can be based primarily on personaleval-
uations.
Banks and direct markets
Banks provide such services in order to earn a
profit; specifically, by charging a large enough
spread betweentheir lending rates (RI) and their
depositor borrowing (or deposit) rates (Rb) to
cover the costs of doing business, including a
premium for risk-taking. But the size of the
spread they can charge is limited by competition
with other intermediaries and other financial
markets. In choosing between a bank and a
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Thusbanks can alter their relative attractiveness
vis~a-vis direct finance markets either by chang-
ing RI or Rb. For example, if R I rises, the
demandfor bank as compared to open-market
creditfalls. This requires an·increase in Rs to
equate supply withdemand. The same reduction
of.the credit flow can be accomplished by
decreasing Rb. This will reduce the supply of
credit to banks relative to open-market credit,
and will. require a decrease in Rs to equate
demand with supply.
II. Commercial Paper Market Versus.CommercialBanks
The abstract principles and choices discussed
in the previous section are carried out in the
economy through a complex system ofdifferent
intermediaries and financial markets. This arti-
cle is concerned with the relationships between
intermediation through large money-center
banks (such as those in New York), and direct
finance through the nonfinancial commercial-
papermarket. Thesetwo types ofinstitutionscan
be characterized as competing for the flow of
short-term credit from large financial and non-
financial corporations to other large, highly-
rated nonfinancial corporations. In order to
analyze recent developments in their ongoing
relationships, we must consider the institutional
framework in which they operate.
Borrowers
Commercial paper consists ofshort-term pro-
missory notes issued by both nonfinancial and
financial corporations.3 In the third quarter of
1978, total commercial paper outstanding
reached $75.3 billion~ofwhich$44.9 billion was
issued by nonbank financial companies (almost
entirely sales- and personal-finance companies),
$17.7 billion by nonfinancial corporations, and
$12.7 billion by commercial-bank holding com-
panies (Chart I). Original maturities ofcommer-
cialpaper range from one to 270 days, but
average less than60 days. This method offinance
is limited primarily to large, highly-rated, and
often nationally known firms, because commer-
cial paper is usually not secured by any specifi-
cally designated collateral~althoughit does of
course have debt's prior claim over equity. To
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gain access to the market, however, issuers
generally must maintain bank lines-of-credit,
often in amounts equal to their paper outstand-
ing. Well over 700 firms hold commercial paper
ratings.4 Ofthe three ratings available (Prime-I,
Prime-2, and Prime-3), only the highest two
provide ready access to the market. Further-
more, interest rates on the paper of P-2 rated
firms run about 25 basis points higher than the
rates on P-I rated paper at present.
Financecompaniesarethelargestsingle group
of commercial-paper issuers. Because of their
large and steady needs for financing their rela-
tively short-term assets, they place most oftheir
debt direGtly in the commercial-paper market
with the help of permanent sales staffs.s Once
firms make the fixed investment in sales facili-
ties, acquire the necessary investor contacts, and
commit themselves to "making" a market in
their paper, they tend to rely primarily on com-
mercial paper and only secondarily on bank
loans. Thus, since we are concerned with the
competition between banks and the paper mar-
ket, we do not discuss finance-company paper
further.
Nonfinancial corporations are the second
largest group of paper issuers. These firms use
the papermarketprimarilytofinance short-term
orseasonal expenditures on such items as inven-
tories, payrolls and tax liabilities. Theyissue this
paper through dealers, since the size and/or
consistency of their borrowing needs do not
justify placement through their own staffs.6 In
addition, nonfinancial companiessometimes use
the.paper market to obtain temporary funds,rates. Starting from a base of almost zero in
1974, their outstandings represented roughly 10
percent ofnonfinancial paperattheendof1977.8
In making short-term financing decisions,
prime-rated domestic nonfinancial corporations
weigh the relatively high cost ofborrowingfrom
banks versus issuing paper against the unique
services offered by banks. The spread between
the bank prime-lending rate and commercial-
paper· yields is the major element in the
borrowing-cost differential.9 In the current eco-
nomic expansion (1975:2-1978:3), the prime-
rate spread has varied from 90 to 156 basis
points, and has averaged over 125 basis points
(Chart 2). Despite the large spread, banks have
been able to attract some prime-rated loan cus-
tomers during this period because of the risk
protection and other services they offer.
Lenders
Relatively little quantitative information is
available on the amounts of commercial paper
held by various types of investors. However,
survey information indicates that the major
holders are nonfinancial corporations, and that
less significant quantities are held by bank trust
departments, small country banks, insurance
companies, privatepensionfunds, stateand local
governments, investment companies and foun-
dations. Many of these firms buy commercial
paper with funds temporarily available for a
predictable period oftime. Forexample,a nonfi-
nancial corporation might buy paper with cash
needed to meet a payroll in a certain known
number of days. Alternatively, the firm might
purchase some other money-market instrument,
such as large negotiable certificates of deposit
(CD's) or Treasury bills.
Unlike most other money-market instru-
ments, commercial paper has no established
secondary market. This problem is largely over-
come, however, by the tailoring ofmaturities to
fit investors' needs. Thus in the example above,
the corporation could buy paper which matures
on the day the payroll is due, instead ofbuying a
longer-term CD and selling it in the secondary
mark.et when cash is needed. Furthermore, if a
commercial-paper holder experiences unfore-
seen cash needs, many direct-placers and dealers















when they wish to delay bond sales in anticipa-
tionofmorefavorable marketconditions. Short-
term bank loans provide their major alternative
source of funds to paper-market sales. Since
these firms generally representpotentialcustom-
ers of the large money-center banks, the best
availablemeasure ofthepapermarket'scompeti-
tionis provided by the short-term commercial
and industrial loans (excluding bankers'accept-
ances) ofselected large weekly reporting banks.7
In 1978:3, these bank loans outstanding totaled
$55.0 billion (Chart I).
Not all nonfinancial paperis issued bydomes-
tic firms. Foreign corporations, especially
French utilities, have issued increased amounts
ofpapersince shortlyafterthe removal in 1974 of
U.S. controls on capital outflows and foreign
controls on capital inflows. These borrowers,
who apparently do not usually use U.S. bank
loans, have entered the U.S. paper market be-
cause of the sizeable spread between European
bank-loan rates and U.S. commercial-paper
Source: Federal Reserve BankofNewYork and Board ofGover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System.
43if the hol(ier is a regular customer. The spread
betw~enthe commercial paper rate (RCP) and
the CDrate(RCD) has averaged only one basis
point, and ha.s varied between -16 and 12 basis
points, .over the 1975:2-1978:3 period (Chart
2).10 .Theismall <spread.reflects .the fact that
holders ofCD's do not receive the substantial
bank services obtained by holders of small-
denomination deposits. In buying a large CD,
the· investor is simply purchasing a money-
marketsecuritywhich happens to be issued by a
bank.
Interaction between borrowers and lenders
Thecommercial"paper market is competitive
with boththeassets and liabilitiesofcommercial
banks. Onthebankassetside, commercial-paper
sales are the major alternative to bank loansto
prime-rated nonfinancial corporations. Unthe
bank liability side, commercial"paperpurchases
are a major alternative to bankCD's for corpo-
rate investors oftemporarily idle cash.Thus,the
commercial-paper market offerseligiblecorpo-
rations the opportunity to borrowfromandlend
to each other without the intermediaryservices
of commercial banks.
The spread between the prime bank-lending
rate (RP) and interest rates paid in the dealer-
placed commercial-paper market (RCP)should
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Note: Paper rate equals yield on a 4-6 month prime commerCial paper. CO rate equals yield on 90-day large
negotiable CD's. Prime rate equals prevailing rate on prime business loans at large banks.
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obtainable in the dealer-placed commercial-
paper market (RCP) and yields on alternative
assets such as CD's (RCD) should importantly
influence the demand for nonfinancial paper. By
subtracting the demand-side yield spread
(RCD-RCP) from the supply-side yield spread
(RP-RCP), we obtain what we will call thebank
spread (S=RP-RCD), which summarizes the
incentives ofbothdemandersand supplierswhen
deciding whether to channel short-term corpo-
rate credit through banks or through the paper
market. (The bank spread is the rate spread
which would appear in a reduced-form equation
for the stock of commercial paper.)11 When the
bank spread rises, forexample, a greaterpropor-
tion of this credit flow can be expected to go
through the commercial-paper market. This
involves some loss of risk protection and other
bank services, but is presumably offset by the
lower cost of channeling the funds.
As an empirical matter, this approach in-
volves choosing a measure of the total flow of
credit to be divided between thebankandpaper-
market channels. In theory, this measure could
be obtainedequallywell from theliabilitiesofthe
borrowers involved, or from the assets of the
lenders; in practice, available data suggest the
use of the liability measure. Furthermore, as
noted earlier, both the level and the changes in
the bank spread have been explained primarily
by the prime rate-paper rate spread faced by
borrowers, ratherthanbythe paperrate-CDrate
spread faced by lenders (Chart 2). Thus most
(but certainly not all) of the "action" in the
bank/paper relationship has been related to
changes in the financial incentives ofborrowers.
For these two reasons, we will focus henceforth
on movements in one particular ratio, with the
numerator representing total nonfinancialpaper
outstanding, and the denominator representing
that same paper outstanding plus an estimate of
total short-term bank loans to those nonfinan-
cial corporations who are potential issuers of
paper. 12
III. Changes in the Paper Market-Commercial Bank Relationship
Prior to the "credit crunches" of the mid-to-
late 1960's, large commercial banks played the
dominant role in the short-term financing of
prime-rated corporations, despite significantly
lower borrowing costs in the commercial-paper
market. During the "crunches," many of these
borrowers were introduced to the papermarket,
and in the first halfofthe 1970's became highly
sensitive to the relative borrowingcosts ofloans
versus paper. Since 1975, however, thisdegreeof
substitution has fallen dramatically: many eligi-
ble firms now meet their short-term credit needs
primarily in the paper market, and obtain loans
only as a supplementary source of funds. Why
have they switched from intermediationto direct
finance? Is this a permanent switch, or is it soon
likely to be reversed?
Pre-"credit crunch" era
Prior to the late 1960's, the prime rate-paper
rate spread consistently favored the paper mar-
ket. Duringthe 1961-65 period, for example, the
spread(calculated with the4-6 monthpaperrate)
averaged 88 basis points. Despite this spread,
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eligible corporations relied primarily on loans,
using paper only as a supplementary source of
funds. 13 Perhaps corporate bank customers did
not shift into the paper market at that time
because they placed a high value on the services
which banks offered to their regular customers.
But this can be only a partial explanation,
because these services-such as cyclical risk
reduction and credit ratings based on personal
experience-probably are not valued highly by
many of the large well-known firms eligible to
issue commercial paper.
Throughoutthelengthyperiodoflownominal
interest rates prior to the mid-1960's, large
corporations maintained a strong tradition of
primary reliance on banksfor short-termcredit.
They recognized the potential gains obtainable
from managing assets and liabilities withsophis-
ticatedtechniques, but did not believe the gains
were large enough to justify the costs. This
situation inhibited the growth of the
commercial-paper market from both the de-
mand and supply sides. Corporate treasurers
were content to leave large sums ofliquid assetsin low~interest or noninterest~bearingbank de-
posits, and thus reduced the supply offunds to
the money markets. In addition, they were often
content to· ignore interest-cost minimization
when managing their liabilities, and thus limited
thedemand for money-market funds. 14
Thesituationdid,notchangesignificantlyeven
when short-term interest rates began their secu-
lar rise in the early 1960's. After years ofexperi-
ence in dealing with each other, banks and their
customers had typically worked out a subtle set
of individually designed services and associated
(explicit and implicit) prices. Since these ar-
rangements were based on personal contacts-
on personal "loyalty," even-they could not
easily or quickly be established elsewhere. Thus,
a customer who obtained more than a token
amount of credit from the paper market (the
bank's competitor) could seriously disrupt a
smoothly-functioning bank relationship. In-
deed, a 1964 survey oflarge corporations found
that 60 percentdid notincreasetheircommercial
paper outstanding for fear of straining bank
relationships. 15 A potential borrower in the
paper market might be wary of entering a rela-
tively long-run commitment to an untested
source offunds. The expected profits might be
attractive, but the risk associated with these
profits might also be large. Also, such an action
mightinvolve certainfixed start-upcosts, suchas
actually developing the necessary expertise in
using the market. For firms with professional
personnel trained in the tradition ofbankfinanc-
ing, these costs could be substantial. Thus,
strong financial incentives were necessary to
push eligible firms over the threshold into pri-
mary or even significant reliance on commercial
paper.
"Credit crunches"
In the latterhalfofthe 1960's, the commercial-
paper market underwent dramatic growth, Dur-
ing 1965-70, totalcommercial paperoutstanding
increased from $9.8 billion to $37,1 billion-an
annual growth rate of 26.6 percent, compared
with the 14.7-percent average growth of the
preceding five-year period. Nonfinancial paper
accelerated evenmoresharplythanthe marketas
a whole, growing at a 34.4-percent annual rate
during 1965-70, as against the 1l.2-percent aver-
age growth of the 1960-65 period,
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Two basic factors converged in this period to
push many eligible nonfinancial corporations
over the threshold into the commercial-paper
market. Ulefirst was the upward trend in short-
term interest rates. As explained above, this
motivated corporations to manage their liquid
!lssetsand liabilities actively, and thus set the
stage for growth from both the demand and
supply sides of the paper market.
Jhe second factor, which determined the tim-
ing ofthe rapid paper-market growth, was the
"credit crunches" of 1966 and 1969-70. Banks
had difficulty meeting strong loan demand dur-
ing these periods of disintermediation, when
open-market interest rates rose above the Regu-
lation Q ceilings on CD rates, During these
periods, banks actually encouraged their finan-
cially strongest customers to issue commercial
paper, and offered them lines of credit to back
their outstanding paper. Borrowers entered the
paper market who had previously hesitated to do
so, despite lower borrowing costs, for fear of
straining bank relationships. In addition, for
many firms, reduced credit availability for the
first time gave them a reason to incur the "start-
up" costs associated with greatly increased reli-
ance on the paper market.
Disintermediation in the late 1960's thus
caused a sharp upward-and irreversible-shift
in nonfinancial corporate use ofthecommercial-
paper market. 16 Commercial banks essentially
have conceded that their prime-rated customers
can substitute between paperand loanswithouta
substantial loss of other bank services. Indeed,
banks have greatly assisted the subsequent
growth of the commercial-paper market by
granting lines-of-credit, with standard compen-
sating balance requirements, to support out-
standing commercial paper. Not being able to
obstruct the market's development, the banks
have apparently decided to profit as much as
possible from its growth.
Post-"credit crunch" era
In the first half of the 1970's, prime-rated
nonfinancial corporations allocated their short-
term credit flows, througheitherthe banks orthe
paper market, on the basis primarily of the
relativecosts involved (Chart3), Indeed, a strong
positive relationship existed between the propor-
tion of nonfinancial paper and short-term bank1970 1972 1974 1976 1978
Note: Data are seasonally adjusted. Bank loans are business
loans, excluding bankers acceptances, from selected
large banks (see footnote 7).
Sources:Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System:
Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
to a high of $3.5 billion (0.65 percent of total
loans) in 1976.20 This experience increased the
perceived riskiness of loan portfolios, causing
banks to seek compensation by increasing the
risk premium included in loan rates. Another
contributing factor was the growing concern by
banks and their regulatory agencies about the
adequacy of capital relative to bank assets. For
V.S. insured commercial banks, the ratio of
equity to total bank assets (less cash and V.S.
Government securities) declined fairly steadily
from 14.1 percentin 1963t08.0percentin 1974.21
This decline represented an erosion in the cush-
ion provided by bank capital to depositors
against loanlosses, andmayhave led toregulato-
ry pressure restricting further growth in loan
portfolios.
Banks also tended to maintain a high spread
because oftwo increasingly commonfeatures of
their prime-rate setting behavior. First, banks
often tie rates on existing loans to those on new
loans, as a means of protecting themselves
against the risk of rapidly rising interest rates.
Profits can be squeezed when rates rise, because
bank liabilities generally have shorter maturities
than bankassets-butthis problemcanbeallevi-
Chart 3
Substitution Between Commercial Paper
and Short-Term Bank Loans
borrowingaccomplished throughthe papermar-
ket (P), and the bank spread (S=RP-RCD). As
the cost of channeling funds through the in-
termediary (commercial banks) rose, nonfinan-
cial corporations channeleda greaterproportion
of short-term credit through the open-market
alternative (the paper market). But the relation-
ship between P and S has clearly broken down
since 1975, as will be seen below.
In view of the increased responsiveness of
paper-market growth to relative-cost considera-
tions, the typical pre-crunch bank spreads of50
basis points or more should have stimulated
much greater paper utilization. This, in fact,
happened in 1970-71. 17 But in 1972-73, interest-
rate controls artificially depressed the bank
spread, and this temporarily postponed the ex-
pected growthin thepapermarket. As partofthe
general program of wage and price controls
initiated in 1971, the Committee on Interest and
Dividends developed voluntary controls on cer-
tain "administered" interest rates, including the
bank prime-lending rate. 18 Because of these
restraints, the bank spread actually became
negative in the first three quarters of 1973. Thus,
not surprisingly, the commercial paper share of
the market declined, with P falling from almost
17 percent to just over 11 percent between 1972:2
and 1973:3.
With the removalofcontrols, large bankswere
able to re-establish conformity between desired
and actual prime rates, and the spread jumped
from -74 to 96 basis points between 1973:3 and
1974: I. This stimulated an almost immediate
increase in the commercial paper market share,
with P rising from 11.2 percent to 15.6 percent.
Then, in 1974-75, the prime rate increased even
moresharply. Large banks established a roughly
ISO-basis point spread between their prime-loan
rate and the commercial paper (and CD) rate, a
new high for the post-1966 period. As a result,
they lost a significant portion of the short-term
credit market to commercial paper.
Why, in the face ofsuch stiffcompetition, did
banks increase their rates so sharply?19 First,
large loan losses suffered during the 1974-76
period probably contributed to the high spread.
Net loan losses for V.S. insured commercial
banks rose from an average ofabout $1.0 billion




















-1.00ated if rates charged on existing assets increase
along with market rates. In early February 1977,
about two-thirds ofshort-term loans and three-
fourths of long-term loans extended by large
banks carried these floating rates.22 Second,
many banks setinterest rates on new nonprime
loanstoestablished loancustomersata predeter-
minedmark-upoverthe prime rate. This practice
simplifies the process ofsettingloan rates once a
particular mark-up has been established for a
regular loan customer. Both of these practices
have become increasingly popular in the recent
environment of high and variable inflation and
interest rates. This rate-setting approach lowers
the marginal revenue gained by reducing the
prime to compete for new loan customers, and
thus tends to raise the spread overthe paper rate.
Finally, sharp increases in the rate spread may
themselves cause a reduction in the elasticity of
overall loan demand. A high prime rate induces
some commercial-paper issuers to accomplish
most, if not all, of their short-term financing
through the paper market. This means that a
larger proportion of remaining bank loan cus-
tomers are those who cannot shift to
commercial-paper financing when bank-loan
rates rise. With rates on nonprime loans often
tied to the prime, prime-rate changes serve the
dual role of competing for two sets of loan
customers: those with elastic and those with
inelastic demand curves. As the prime rate rises
and prime-rated firms switch to the paper mar-
ket, the elasticdemandfor loans has less effect on
bank revenues. Thus further increases in the
prime rate are induced by thedecreased elasticity
ofoverallloandemand. Inaddition, the riskiness
of bank-loan portfolios rises when prime-rated
firms reduce their reliance on bank loans. This
causes further prime-rate increases as banks tie
existing and new non-prime loan rates to the
prime rate.23
Commercial-paper era
Since about early 1976, the relationship be-
tween the bank spread and commercial-paper
usage has broken down (Chart 3). Commercial
paper as a proportion of short-term debt rose
from .19.0 percent in 1976:1 to 24.3 percent in
1978:3, despite a decline in the rate spread, from
162 to 110 basis points, over the same period.24
Two factors help explain these apparently diver-
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gent movements. First, a number offirms have
entered the paper marketfor reasons unaffected
by changes in the rate spread. But most
importantly, many firms already in the paper
market have reduced their short-term bank-loan
balances to very low levels, and have thus
gtopped actively substituting between paper and
loans.
As noted earlier, several large foreign utilities
have entered the papermarketsince 1974, appar-
ently to take advantage of the large spread
betwee.u El.lropean bank-loan rates and U.S.
commercial-paper rates. Forexample, in 1977:4,
the French prime bank-loan rate was 11.35
percent, compared toa 90-119 day U.S. prime
commercial paper rate of 6.55 percent. Foreign
issuers have reportedly accounted for about one
third of nonfinancial-paper growth since mid-
1974. When this foreign paper is deducted from
total nonfinancial paper, the paper marketshare
(P) is reduced from 23.7 to 21.7 percent in 1977:4.
The same type of development has been evi-
dent on·the domestic side, as more and more
eligible firms have become convinced that high
bank spreads are here to stay. In 1976, the
number of firms rated by Moody's Investors'
Service grew ata 17.2 percent pace, comparedto
very small or negative growth rates in 1972-75.
But entry as a source of further paper-market
growth is limited by the number of companies
who qualify as potential issuers of paper. This
source ofgrowth may already have been largely
used up. In 1977, the number of firms rated by
Moody's grew only 4.3 percent, despite the
continued large cost incentives to enter the
market.
Perhaps the most important reason for the
apparent paradox of a declining spread and
rising paper-market share is the maintenance of
the spread well above the threshold which had
already attracted heavy paper-market usage by
most eligible firms already in the commercial-
paper market. A 1977 survey of Fortune 1000
companies suggests that many eligible firms are
now relying primarily on the commercial-paper
market for their short- and intermediate-term
funds. 25 About 35 percent of the surveyed first
500 and 19 percent of the second 500 do not
borrow at all from commercial banks. Of the
remainder ofthese two groups, 53 and 9percent,respectively, have issued paper in the past. Rea-
sons cited for using loans in addition to paper
include: primarily as a back-up credit line to
paper outstandings (48 percent); as a more flexi-
ble source offunds (44 percent); and as a signifi-
cant source of funds whenever a "reasonable"
cost difference exists between bank credit and
commercial paper (40 percent).
Once the spread rises significantlyabove levels
sufficient to reduce firms' bank-loan balances to
very low levels, further moderate changes inthe
spread will have.only a small impact on short-
term financing decisions. Thus, a movement
from say, 150 to 125 basis points will have much
less impacton marketshares thana changefrom,
say, 50 to 25 basis points. A mid-1977 survey of
corporate treasurers indicated that many firms
would not consider increasing their short-term
bank borrowing until the spread fell to the 25-50
basis point range, while others would not do so
until the spread actually favored loans. 26 The
actual spread for P-2 rated paper issuers (i.e.,
marginal issuers) jumped from an average of57
basis points in 1974:4-1975:3, to an average of
123 basis points in 1974:4-1978:2, and never fell
below 97 basis points in the latter period. The
sharp increase in the spread for these firms
coincided with the breakdown in the spread-
market share relationship.
These considerations, together with the high
present level of the spread, seem to imply that
banks would have to reduce the spread substan-
tially to restrict the growth of the commercial-
paper share of the market. In addition, if most
potential paper issuers have already entered the
market, further increases in the spread might not
lead to any further increase in commercial pa-
per's market share.
Secular shift?
The remaining question concerns whether
banks will reduce their prime-ratespreadenough
in the foreseeable future to regain their former
position as the major source ofshort-term funds
for prime-rated nonfinancial corporations. For-
tunately, an answer to this question does not
require a prediction of future changes in the
spread, which depend on such difficult-to-
forecast factors as bank-loan portfolio risk,
growth in bank capital, and bank willingness to
make fixed-rate loans. Even if such influences
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were completely eliminated, the prime rate
would still probably be too high for banks to
regain many loan customers from the
commercial-paper market.
Fora loantobe profitable,a bank mustset the
loan rate at a mark-up over its current cost of
loanable funds by enough at least to recover the
reserve-requirementcosts andvariable operating
costs associated with making and servicing the
loan. Banks face a current cost offunds roughly
eql1alto the interest rates on money-market
instruments,such as prime commercial paper
and large negotiable CD's. Thus any mark-up in
the prime rate over the bank cost offundsmakes
it more expensive for top-rated corporations to
borrow at banks than in the paper market.
Reserve requirement costs alone represent a
mark-up of over 55 basis points at mid-1978
yields on CD's of 8.67 percent,27 Even at the
1977:I interest rate trough of 4.63 percent,
reserve-requirement costs translated into almost
30 basis points. Less complete dataare available
on bank operating costs, but a recent Federal
Reserve study ofa group ofmedium-sized banks
suggests that their variable noninterest costs for
business loans average just over 100 basis
points.28 Given the economies of scale in bank-
ing, this estimate probablyoverstatesthecosts at
money-center banks, but suggests at least that
they are most likely substantial.
These cost factors tend to set a floor belowthe
rate spread, which gives most eligible corpora-
tions a substantial cost advantage in issuing
commercial paper. For reasons already dis-
cussed, nonfinancial corporations increasingly
have focused theirattention onrelativecosts, not
bank relationships, in deciding between alterna-
tive sources of finance. Most prime-rated firms
are not willing to pay a large prime rate-paper
rate spread because they receive relatively little
value from the intangible intermediary services
offered by banks. Furthermore, many suchfirms
can enjoy the benefits ofa sound bank relation-
ship and take advantage of lower borrowing
costs in the paper market at the same time. For
the foreseeable future, therefore, banksprobably
will not be able to lower their spreads enough to
attract substantial loan business from the
commercial-paper market.29
However, the rate spread for corporationswith less than the top commercial-paper rating
may well favor the use of bank credit during
periods ofstress in the financial markets, suchas
happened in 1974. During this period, several
corporations (including paper-issuing utilities
an.dREIT's) experienced difficulties, and some
giant firms (e.g., W.T. Grant) actually failed. In
response to a perceived increase in lending risks,
the spread between Prime-2 and Prime-I (30-59
day) dealer-placed paper rates averaged about
145 basis points in the 1974:3-1975: I period,and
reached a peak of 153 basis points in 1974:4.
Thus, future periods of financial stress might
lead some firms to shift from paper-market
financing to bank financing. Still, this would
most likely be a temporary phenomenon, lasting
only until prime rate-paperrate spreads returned
to more normal levels for Prime-2 firms.
The low sensitivity of paper-market borrow-
ing to the prime rate-paper rate spread implies a
similar low sensitivity of business-loan demand.
The use of past statistical relationships (which
include the rate spread as an explanatory vari-
able) to forecast business-loan movements might
well produce misleading results, at least until
enoughtimehas elapsed to estimatenew demand
relationships. However, business loans may be a
IV. Conclusions and Policy .Implications
In this paper, we have argued that the Competition from thecommercial-papermar-
commercial-paper market has replaced the ket affects large money-center banks more than
banking sector as the primary source of short- other banks, since their typical customersare the
termfunds for large, financially sound nonfinan- firms mostlikely to be active in the papermarket.
cial corporations. Banks can compete effectively These giant corporations, typically highly liquid,
with the open-market only if the value of their generally have modest external financing needs
intermediary services to ultimate lenders and until late in cyclical expansions. Thus, business
borrowers is greater than the spread between the loan activity at money-center banks is usually
lending and borrowing rates that they must sluggish until near business-cycle peaks, butthen
charge to cover the costs of doing business and grows rapidly. Increased corporate use of the
absorbing risk. We concluded that the value of paper market contributed to greater-than-usual
these services is relatively small for those large weakness in large bank loanactivity in the earlier
corporations who are eligible to participate in stages of the present recovery, and may also
the commercial-paper market. Thus, the recent mean that the spurt in loan demand may not be
switch from an intermediary to a direct-finance as strong at the next cyclical peak as at earlier
market as a means of channeling short-term peaks. But money-center banks still may be able
funds between large corporations has probably to capture some loan business from less-highly
improved the efficiency of the U.S. financial rated paper issuers, because risk premiumsin the
system. paper market tend to rise as financial strains
What are the public-policy implications? With develop near the end of expansion periods. At
prime-rated firms now a smaller factor in the that point, however, reserve-requirement costs
market for short-term bank loans, the riskiness (which are significantly higher for large than for
of bank-loan portfolios tends to increase, thus small banks) will widen their competitive disad-
exposing the banking system to greater market vantage vis-a-vis the paper market. These costs
risk. The probable permanence of this develop- vary positively with market interest rates, and
ment should be of interest to bank regulators will thus be at their highest point in the stage of
when determining capital-adequacy standards the cycle when large banks might otherwise be
for the banks they supervise. Furthermore, this able to capture some short-term loan business
greater risk exposure reinforces the effects of from the paper market.
other major postwar trends in bank balance
sheets, such as the reduction in capital cushions
and the declining ratio oflow-risk security hold-
ings to loans. At thesame time, banks have come
to rely on liability management as their main
source of liquidity. Because of that factor, a
liquidity squeeze could result from policy at-
tempts to restrict the flexibility of liability man-
agement, such as through a greater restric-
tiveness of Regulation Q interest-rate ceilings.30
50more useful business-cycle indicator than in the
past, since loan movements over the cycle will
probably not be significantly affected bychanges
in the prime rate-paper rate spread. Thus, the
correlation between loans and business spending
(and thus the business cycle) may be stronger
than in the past.
Innovations in institutional arrangements are
not uncommon events in financial markets.
Indeed,according to a large body of economic
literature, the scope of financial intermediaries
has expanded relative to direct finance markets
as the economy has become more complex and
specialized. In this paper, however, we have
pointed out one case in which the process has
been reversed, with the scope ofthecommercial-
paper market increasing relative to that oflarge
commercial banks.
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